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Abstract 
 
Under international humanitarian law it is prohibited to make the object of attack a person that has 
surrendered. This article explores the circumstances in which the act of surrender is effective under 
international humanitarian law and examines in particular how surrender can be achieved in 
practical terms during land warfare in the context of international and non-international armed 
conflict. First, this article situates surrender within its broader historical and theoretical setting, 
tracing its legal development as a rule of conventional and customary international humanitarian 
law and arguing that its crystallisation as a law of war derives from the lack of military necessity to 
directly target persons that have placed themselves outside of armed conflict and that such conduct 
is unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective. Second, after a careful examination of state 
practice, this article proposes a three-stage test for determining whether persons have surrendered 
under international humanitarian law: 1) have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a 
positive act which clearly reveals that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities? 2) is it 
reasonable in the circumstances prevailing at the time for the opposing force to discern the offer of 
surrender? and 3) have surrendered persons unconditionally submitted to the authority of their 
captor?  
 
Keywords: surrender; international humanitarian law; hors de combat; military necessity; humanity. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is inconvertible that under international humanitarian law it is unlawful to directly target an 
enemy that has surrendered. Indeed, sƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝƐ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌƵůĞƐ ?1 of international 
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶůĂǁďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůdevice for containing destruction and death in our 
                                                          
1
  ‘/ŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ?ŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞWƌŽƚŽĐŽů ?ĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůWƌŽƚŽĐŽů
/ ? ? ?zves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary to Additional Protocol I (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1987) 480.   
2 
 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?.2 Without a legal guarantee that they will not be made the object of attack once they 
have laid down their weapons and submitted themselves to the authority of their enemy, there 
would be no incentive for those persons engaged in hostilities to surrender and fights to the death 
would invariably ensue, thereby prolonging armed conflict and fuelling unnecessary violence and 
suffering.  Given the centrality of the rule of surrender to realising the humanitarian objective of 
international humanitarian law, it is paramount that those involved in armed conflict are aware of 
what conduct constitutes an act of surrender under international humanitarian law and thus when 
its attendant legal obligation to ceasefire is triggered. More specifically, questions arise as to what 
conduct signals an intention to surrender: for example, is the waiving of a white flag indicative of 
surrender? Is retreat tantamount to surrender? Another important question is whether combatants 
are required to offer vanquished forces the opportunity to surrender before direct targeting can 
commence?  Also, must all offers of surrender be accepted or are there circumstances in which an 
offer of surrender can be permissibly refused?  
 
One would usually expect to find the answers to these questions in those international humanitarian 
law treaties that contain the rule of surrender and the military manuals that states produce in order 
to guide the conduct of their armed forces during times of armed conflict and to streamline their 
conduct in conformity with international humanitarian law. By and large, however, these treaties do 
not fully delineate the meaning of the rule of surrender and, while military manuals overwhelmingly 
require that armed forces do not make surrendered persons the object of attack, they generally fail 
to specify the conditions that constitute a legally effective surrender. 
 
                                                          
2
 Holger AfflĞƌďĂĐŚ ? ‘'ŽŝŶŐŽǁŶǁŝƚŚ&ůǇŝŶŐŽůŽƵƌƐ PEĂǀĂů^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĨƌŽŵůŝǌĂďĞƚŚĂŶƚŽKƵƌKǁŶdŝŵĞƐ ? ?
Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan (eds), How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender (OUP, 2014) 188. 
 
3 
 
What is perhaps most surprising is that there has been relatively little consideration of the rule of 
surrender within international humanitarian law literature. Although this literature routinely 
identifies the rule of surrender as being part and parcel of modern international humanitarian law 
and indeed emphasises the importance of this rule within this legal framework, existing literature 
fails to drill down into this rule and reveal the conditions precedent for an act of surrender to be 
legally effective.
3
  
 
After uncovering the theoretical basis for the rule of surrender and after identifying relevant state 
practice in the context of this rule, the objective of this article is to fill this gap in scholarship by 
clarifying what conduct constitutes an act of surrender under international humanitarian law. Note 
that the focus of this article is upon the rule of surrender during land warfare in the context of 
international and non-international armed conflict. This article does not consider when acts of 
surrender are legally effective during naval and aerial warfare, to which different rules apply.
4
  
 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 situates surrender within its broader historical and 
theoretical context in order to provide a better understanding of the development of the rule of 
surrender within conventional and customary international humanitarian law and also the function 
of the rule of surrender during armed conflict. Section 3 explores state practice with the view to 
identifying when an offer of surrender is effective under international humanitarian law and 
                                                          
3
 dŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŚĞƌĞŝƐ,ŽƌĂĐĞZŽďĞƌƚƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞKďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĐĐĞƉƚ^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Law 
Studies 541. However, rather than engaging in an intensive analysis of the rule of surrender during land 
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ?ZŽďĞƌƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĂĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĂƚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐƵƉŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ/ƌĂƋŝƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŵĂŶŶŝŶŐŽŝů
platforms during the First Gulf War had effectively expressed an intention to surrender under international 
humanitarian law before they were attacked by US helicopters.   
4
  ‘/ŶƚŚĞĂŝƌ ?ŝƚŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĐƌĞǁǁŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽn to cease combat, should do 
ƐŽďǇǁĂŐŐůŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŝŶŐƐǁŚŝůĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽĐŬƉŝƚ ? ?^ĂŶĚŽz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (n 1 ? ? ? ? ? ‘/ŶŶĂǀĂů
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ?ƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐŝŐŶŽĨƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝƐƚŽƐƚƌŝŬĞƚŚĞĨůĂŐ ? ?WƌŽŐƌĂŵŽŶ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶWŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
Research, Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (2010) 
266. 
4 
 
proposes a three-stage test that can be used to determine whether an enemy has extended a valid 
offer of surrender. Section 4 provides some conclusions.  
 
2. The Legal Development of the Rule of Surrender   
 
The act of surrender possesses a political, military and legal dimension. It has a political dimension in 
the sense that an act of surrender indicates that a surrendering party has been defeated and the 
opposing force has been victorious. In its military context the act of surrender denotes that the 
person surrendering is no longer engaged in hostilities; that he or she is hors de combat.
5
 In its legal 
dimension, where a valid offer of surrender is communicated to and received by opposing forces 
they are legally obligated to accept that offer and refrain from making surrendered persons the 
object of attack.
6
 This article is concerned with exploring the legal status and content of the rule of 
surrender and this section traces the emergence of this rule within conventional and customary 
international humanitarian law during international and non-international armed conflict as well as 
identifying its theoretical basis. 
 
2.1 Customary International Humanitarian Law and the Rule of Surrender 
 
                                                          
5
 Hors de combat is a French phrase commonly used in international humanitarian law to mean  ‘ŽƵƚŽĨĐŽŵďĂƚ ? ?
6
 For the purpose of clarity, it must be stressed that the legal obligation imposed by the rule of surrender is 
that opposing forces cannot directly target surrendered persons. The rule of surrender does not require the 
opposing force to detain surrendered persons as prisoners of war (although they can if they wish). Also, 
although surrendered persons cannot be made the object of attack, they can be the victims of incidental injury 
as a result of attacks against lawful targets providing that the collateral damage is not excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; see Article 51(5)(b) Additional Protocol I 1977; Jean-
Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I: Rules (CUP, 
2005, revised 2009) Rule 14. 
5 
 
During prehistoric times tribal societies engaged in almost constant armed conflict. These conflicts 
were usually fought without mercy because the initiation of armed conflict was regarded as 
triggering  ‘ƚŽƚĂůǁĂƌ ?, a concept that described  ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ǁĞƌĞ ?ǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽ
ŵĂŬĞĂŶǇƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞŝŶůŝǀĞƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ? ?7 Such environments 
were generally lawless, meaning that the decision to offer surrender was a risky and dangerous 
option for combatants to take.
8
 Indeed, it was commonplace that combatants that had surrendered 
were slain or, at a minimum, their lives spared only to be forced into slavery.
9
 ƐWŝĐŬĞƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ? ‘ ?ŝ ?Ŷ
the earliest human societies, what we call the law of the jungle generally prevailed; the triumph of 
the strongest or most treacherous was followed by monstrous massacres and unspeakable atrocities. 
The code of honŽƵƌĨŽƌďĂĚĞǁĂƌƌŝŽƌƐƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƚŽǁŝŶŽƌĚŝĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŶŽŵĞƌĐǇ ? ?10  
 
A similar story can be told in relation to the regulation of armed conflict and thus the regulation of 
surrender during ancient times. In ancient Greece  ‘'ƌĞĞŬƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐďĞůŝĞĨƐdid not give rise to ethical 
ŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ?11  ‘WƵƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝŶ
ancient Greece very few and rather weak constraints upon indulgence in extremes of military anger 
and hatred, not stopping shoƌƚŽĨŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ?ŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚĞƚŚŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ?12 Armed conflict in ancient Greece 
was therefore largely unregulated and ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ‘ƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬĐŽĚĞŽĨŚŽŶŽƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚŶŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ? ?13 
                                                          
7
  ‘dŽƚĂůtĂƌ ? ?Encyclopedia Britannica Online (2015) https://www.britannica.com/topic/total-war.  
8
  ‘ ?d ?ƌŝďĂůĂŶĚƉƌĞ-state societies seldom [took] prisoners and usually [did] ŶŽƚĂĐĐĞƉƚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?>awrence H 
KeĞůǇ ? ‘^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚWƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐŝŶWƌĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂŶĚdƌŝďĂů^ŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ? ?ŝŶAfflerbach and Strachan (n 2) 7. 
9
  ‘DĂŶǇďĂŶĚƐƚŽŽŬŶŽƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ?ŶŽƚĞǀĞŶchildren or young women. If they did take prisoners it was only 
young women or some women and children. Any males of fighting age or the elderly that fell into band 
ǁĂƌƌŝŽƌƐ ?ƉŽǁĞƌǁĞƌĞƐŝŵƉůǇŬŝůůĞĚ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?/ŬŶŽǁŽĨŶ ƉƌĞ-European contact bands that took male adults 
ĂůŝǀĞ ? ?ibid, 8.   
10
 Jean Picket, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 6. 
11
 Adriaan >ĂŶŶŝ ? ‘dŚĞ>ĂǁƐŽĨtĂƌŝŶŶĐŝĞŶƚ'ƌĞĞĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?26 Law and History Review 469, 476-477.   
12
 Paul Cartledge ? ‘^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŶĐŝĞŶƚ'ƌĞĞĐĞ ? ?ŝŶĨĨůĞƌďĂĐŚĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂĐŚĂŶ (n 2)  ? ? ? ‘ ?d ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐůŝƚƚůĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
that the archaic and classical Greeks enacted internationally recognised laws governing the practice of 
ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ?:ŽƐŝĂŚKďĞƌ ? ‘ůĂƐƐŝĐĂů'ƌĞĞŬdŝŵĞƐ ? ?ŝŶDichael Howard, George J Andreopoulos and Mark R Shulman 
(eds), The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (Yale University Press, 1994) 12. 
13
 Lanni (n 11) 477. 
6 
 
 
The regulation of armed conflict during ancient Rome is captured by Cicero ?ƐǁĞůů-known proverb 
from 50 BC: silent enim leges inter arma (the law stands silent in times of war).
14
 This rather 
simplifies the picture because there is evidence that the Romans formulated rudimentary laws of 
war, such as the prohibition against the use of concealed, barbed and poisoned weapons and the 
prohibition against attacking religious figures.
15
 This being said, the regulation of armed conflict was 
skeletal and said very little about how surrendering forces had to be treated. As in ancient Greece, 
combatants that sought to surrender during armed conflict in ancient Rome were in an extremely 
precarious position and their fate was entirely at the discretion of the opposing force; the offer of 
surrender could be permissibly refused and combatants ƐůĂŝŶ ?ƐWŽůǇďŝƵƐƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚǁĂƐ
that the Romans enter into possession of everything and those who surrender remain in possession 
ŽĨĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?16 This was known as the doctrine of dedito: as soon as opposing forces fell 
into the hands of the Romans they did not technically exist anymore and their Roman captors could 
do with their captives as they pleased. Roman forces did not therefore regard themselves as being 
subject to a legal obligation to accept offers of surrender.
17
 
 
Heavily influenced by the dictates of Christianity and especially the writings of the leading teachers 
in the Catholic Church, it was during the Medieval Ages that concerted attempts were made to 
construct a detailed regulatory framework to govern armed conflict and mitigate the horrors of war. 
^ƚƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ũƵƐƚǁĂƌ ?ŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽǁĂƌǁĂƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
decision to declare war required justification.
18
  ‘KŶĐĞƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞĂůĞŐĂůĂŶĚ
theological basis was accepted, it followed naturally that (at least in conflicts between Christian 
                                                          
14
 Virg. Aen. 2, 353  W 354.  
15
 See generally Wang Tieya and Wei Min, International Law (Beijing: Falu Chubanshe, 1981) 509-510. 
16
 Pol. 36, 4 (Tr. W. R. Paton).  
17
 For a good discussion of surrender in ancient Rome see Loretana ĚĞ>ŝďĞƌŽ ? ‘^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŶĐŝĞŶƚZŽŵĞ ? ?ŝŶ
Afflerbach and Strachan (n 2). 
18
 John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War (Continuum, 2006). 
7 
 
ƉƌŝŶĐĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨůĂǁĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚĂůƐŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?19 The 
emergence of Knights and in particular the code of chivalry that governed their interactions had a 
considerable impact upon the legal regulation of armed conflict.
20
 The kernel of the code of chivalry 
was that Knights were required to treat enemy Knights in an honourable and chivalrous manner and 
an important principle contained within this code was the obligation to accept valid offers of 
surrender.
21
 There were however three notable exceptions to this rule. First, this code of chivalry 
only applied to interactions between recognised Knights. The code of chivalry did not govern the 
relations between Knights and common warriors and Knights were not therefore subject to any legal 
obligation to accept offers of surrender from regular combatants ĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƐŽĨŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ P ‘ƚŚĞ
ĚĞƐƉĞƌĂƚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶǁĂƌƌŝŽƌƐ ?ŵƵƐt be stressed because it warns us against 
overstating the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ƌƵůĞƐŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞŐƵŶƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽĚĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŵŽŶŐŶŽďůĞǁĂƌƌŝŽƌƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞŐĞƐ ? ?22  Second, this code of conduct (and so the 
legal obligation to accept surrender) only applied between Knights that were within Christendom: 
 ‘ƚŚĞĐŽĚĞ ?ŽĨĐŚŝǀĂůƌǇ ?ǁĂƐŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĂƉƉůǇŽŶůǇƚŽŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶƉƌŝŶĐĞƐĂŶĚǁĂƐ
ƐĞůĚŽŵĂƉƉůŝĞĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌƵƐĂĚĞƐ ? ?23 Christian Knights were 
therefore relieved of any obligation to accept offers of surrender by combatants that were not 
Christian.
24
 Third, where a city was subject to a siege and the city refused to surrender, once the city 
was stormed it was accepted that Knights were permitted to sack the city and that the normal code 
                                                          
19
 Mary-Ellen K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ? ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ>ĞŐĂůĂƐŝƐ ? ?ŝŶieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (OUP, 2013) para 109. 
20
 See generally Rain >ŝŝǀŽũĂ ? ‘ŚŝǀĂůƌǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂ,ŽƌƐĞ PDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ,ŽŶŽƵƌĂŶĚƚŚĞDŽĚĞƌŶ>ĂǁŽĨƌŵĞĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?
in Rain Liivoja and Andres Saumets (eds), The Law of Armed Conflict: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
(Tartu University Press, 2012).  
21
 While there was a clear obligation not to make objects of attack enemy Knights that had surrendered, 
captured Knights could still be sold for ransom; John 'ŝůůŝŶŐŚĂŵ ? ‘^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶDĞĚŝĞǀĂůƵƌŽƉĞ W An Indirect 
ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?ŝŶĨĨůĞƌďĂĐŚĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂĐŚĂŶ (n 2) 68 et seq. 
22
 Hans-Henning Kortüm ? ‘^ƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶDĞĚŝĞǀĂůdŝŵĞƐ ? ?ŝŶAfflerbach and Strachan, ibid, 47. 
23
 K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?Ŷ ? ?) para 109. See generally Gerald ƌĂƉĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶŝƚǇĂŶĚŚŝǀĂůƌǇŝŶƚŚĞ
,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨtĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Review of the Red Cross 3.  
24
  ‘ƵƚŝŶǁĂƌƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĨŝĚĞůƐ ?ŽƌďĂƌďĂƌŝĂŶƐ ?ƚŚĞtĞƐƚŚĂĚŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚĂďƌƵƚĂůůĞŐĂĐǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
Romans which they termed bellum romanum, or guerre mortellle, a conflict in which no holds were barred and 
all those designated as ĞŶĞŵǇ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌďĞĂƌŝŶŐĂƌŵƐŽƌŶŽƚ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞŝŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŶĂƚĞůǇƐůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌĞĚ ? ?,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?
 ‘ŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐŽŶtĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? ?ŝŶ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ŶĚƌĞŽƉŽƵůŽƐĂŶĚ^ŚƵůŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ?2) 3 
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of chivalry and the rule mandating the acceptance of surrender was inoperative.
25
 These exceptions 
notwithstanding, the rules contained in the ĐŽĚĞŽĨĐŚŝǀĂůƌǇ ‘ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇŚĂĚĂĐŝǀŝůŝǌŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚĂŶĚ
were ĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?26 For the first time we witnessed an intellectual 
appraisal of the conduct of hostilities and the recognition that warfare needed to be subject to 
limitations and that these limitations could be achieved through the imposition of legal regulation. 
 
The Modern Times brought about an increased tendency to regulate warfare and thus the 
 ‘ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ? ?27 In particular, it was the 
cruelties of ƚŚĞdŚŝƌƚǇzĞĂƌƐtĂƌƚŚĂƚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ‘ůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞjus 
in bello [the law of war] and established a number of principleƐƚŽďĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ ? ?28 
An especially important principle that emerged during this period was that of military necessity. 
According to this principle, combatants could only engage in those measures that were 
 ‘indispensable for securing the ends of the war ?.29 Put otherwise, conduct that was not necessary to 
hasten the ǁĂƌ ?ƐĞŶĚǁĂƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚ ?
 
The principle of military necessity was therefore originally intended to operate as a principle of 
restraint. However, because military necessity was defined so broadly  ? ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞends of the 
war ? ?it essentially became Ă ‘ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨĚĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽŵŝůŝtary judgment about what is really 
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝůǇŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ? ?30 As a result, virtually any conduct could be justified on the basis that it 
accrued a military advantage, even though it was highly dubious from a humanitarian perspective. 
                                                          
25
 Jim Bradbury, The Medieval Siege (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1998). 
26
 K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?Ŷ ? ?) para 109. 
27
 Holger Afflerbach and Hew ^ƚƌĂĐŚĂŶ ? ‘ŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶĨĨůĞƌďĂĐŚĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂĐŚĂŶ ?Ŷ2) 442. 
28
 K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?Ŷ ? ?) para 113.  
29
 Article 15, Lieber Code 1863.  
30
 David >ƵďĂŶ ? ‘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇEĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ>Ăǁ ? (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 315, 343. 
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Thus, rather than imposing restraint, military necessity acted ĂƐĂ ‘ƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝǀĞ ?31 principle and 
became  ‘ĂůŝĐĞŶƐĞĨŽƌŵŝƐĐŚŝĞĨ ? ?32 The principle of military necessity therefore failed to provide an 
effective mechanism to quell the savagery and brutality associated with previous armed conflicts. 
 
During the Age of Enlightenment and under the tutelage of European philosophers, the principle of 
humanity emerged as a counterweight to the principle of military necessity.
33
 At the heart of the 
principle of humanity was the premise that all humans qua humans possessed an inherent human 
ĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞůĂǁ ?is ?ĂŶŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?34 Although 
at first the principle of humanity was used more generally to re-orientate the jurisprudential basis 
of European societies away from notions of divine right and religious privilege towards the values of 
equality, tolerance and justice, its normative influence eventually impacted upon the regulation of 
armed conflict and sought to have a humanising effect on it, encouraging the adoption of rules that 
better protected the human dignity of those embroiled in armed conflict.
35
 The effect was to 
gradually transform the law of war into an international humanitarian law and thus our modern 
international humanitarian law  W being a corpus of law predicated upon the principles of military 
necessity and humanity  W was born. 
 
                                                          
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Burrus DĂƌŶĂŚĂŶ ? ‘>ŝŶĐŽůŶ ?>ŝĞďĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ĂǁƐŽĨtĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?American Journal of International Law 
213, 217. 
33
  ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐǁĂƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚǁĂƌŵŝŐŚƚƐƚŝůůďĞĂŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŝƚ
shoulĚďĞǁĂŐĞĚ ?ƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?Ŷ ?4) 6. 
34
 Luban (n 30) 316. 
35
 See generally Theodor DĞƌŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?American Journal of 
International Law 239. As the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) would later 
explain,  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĐŽƌƉƵƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶůĂǁĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁůŝĞƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇŝŶĞǀĞƌǇƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?dŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇŝƐ ? 
the very ƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?être of ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶůĂǁĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁ ? ?Prosecutor v Furundzija, 
Judgment IT-95-17/I-T, T.Ch. II, 10 December 1998, para 183. 
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On rare occasions the demands of military necessity converge with humanitarian considerations and 
 ‘ƉƌŽŵƉƚƚŚĞůĂǁŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?.36 More often than not, however, the principles of military 
necessity and humanity run into conflict, prompting the law in opposite directions. Where conflict 
occurs the principles of military necessity and humanity have to be delicately balanced, with rules 
being produced that reflect a  ‘ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?37 
 
The view that surrendered forces should not be made the object of attack is supported by the 
principles of military necessity and humanity. Where persons clearly indicate that they no longer 
intend to participate in hostilities, they no longer represent a threat to military security and thus 
there is no military necessity to target them.
38
 Moreover, to target persons that have placed 
themselves outside of the theatre of war constitutes an unacceptable and indefensible affront to 
human dignity and is incongruous with the principle of humanity.
39
 
 
Given that the rule of surrender appeals to international humanitarian law ?ƐƚǁŽĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶĂů
principles of military necessity and humanity, by the end of the 19
th
 century extensive state 
practice had cohered around the notion that enemy forces that had expressed an intention to 
surrender must not be made the object of attack. This is significant because where state practice 
                                                          
36
 Yoram ŝŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ‘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇEĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KǆĨŽƌĚWƵďůŝĐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ?
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e333.  
37
 Michael E^ĐŚŵŝƚƚ ? ‘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇEĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŝŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ƵŵĂŶitarian Law: Preserving the 
ĞůŝĐĂƚĞĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Virginal Journal of International Law 795, 798. 
38
 As Oeter explains, the ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚǀĂůŝĚŽĨĨĞƌƐŽĨƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞĂůŽŐŝĐĂů
expression of the principle that the legal use of military violence is strictly limited to what is required by 
military necessity; clearly there is no necessity to kill persons hors de combat ? ? ?Stefan KĞƚĞƌ ? ‘DĞƚŚŽĚƐĂŶĚ
DĞĂŶƐŽĨŽŵďĂƚ ? ?ŝŶ&ůĞĐŬ ?n 19) 186-187.  
39
 According to ƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝDŝůŝƚĂƌǇDĂŶƵĂů ? ‘ŝƚŝƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĨŽƌďŝĚĚĞŶŝ ƚŚĞƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƐƚƚĞƌŵƐƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬƐƵĐŚĂ
combatant [one who has surrendered]. The moral argument for this is that as long as the soldier is 
participating in the military effort, he knowingly risks his life. When he is clearly asking to surrender and exit 
from the fight or while he is incapable of participating in combat actively, there is no moral justification in 
ĂƚƚĂĐŬŝŶŐŚŝŵ ?ŶŽƌŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĂŶǇŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇƚŽĚŽƐŽ ? ?/ƐƌĂĞů ?Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military 
Advocate-'ĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐŽƌƉƐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ?/&^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ>Ăǁ (2006) 29.   
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ŝƐ ‘ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ?40 within the international society and also coupled with opinio juris (the belief that 
the practice is required by law), such customary practices give rise to international legal 
obligations.
41
 dŚƵƐ ? ‘ďǇĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ? ? ?ŵŽƐƚƉƵďůŝĐŝƐƚƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚĂĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇƌƵůĞǁŚŝĐŚŵĂĚĞŝƚ
ƵŶůĂǁĨƵůƚŽƌĞĨƵƐĞƋƵĂƌƚĞƌŽƌƚŽǁŽƵŶĚŽƌŬŝůůƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇŽĨĨĞƌĞĚƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?42 
 
Nowadays, the customary international law status of the rule of surrender is confirmed by the fact 
that a significant number of military manuals adopted by states - which represent important 
sources of state practice when identifying obligations under customary international humanitarian 
law
43
 - stipulate that it is forbidden to make the object of attack persons that have surrendered. 
Citing the numerous manuals that impose an obligation upon armed forces to accept valid offers of 
surrender, ZƵůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ/Z ?ƐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇInternational Humanitarian Law Study explains that the 
rule of surrender is a principle of customary international law applicable during international and 
non-international armed conflict. Rule 47 reads:  
 
Attacking persons who are recognized as hors de combat is prohibited. A person hors 
de combat is: 
(a) Anyone who is in the power of an adverse party; 
(b) Anyone who is defenceless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or 
sickness; or 
                                                          
40
 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits [2001] ICJ Reports 40, 
para 205. 
 
41
 As Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945 explains, customary international 
ůĂǁĨŽƌŵƐŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂĐĐĞƉƚ ĚĂƐůĂǁ ? ? 
42
 Robertson (n 3) 545.  
43
 As the ICTY explained in the dĂĚŝđ judgment, when identifying state practice in the context of customary 
international humanitarian law  ‘reliance must primarily be placed on such elements as official 
ƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŵĂŶƵĂůƐĂŶĚũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?; WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌǀdĂĚŝđ, Case no IT-94-AR72, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 99. 
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(c) Anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender 
provided he or she abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape.
44
  
 
2.2. Treaty Law and the Codification of the Rule of Surrender 
 
During the American Civil War the US government charged the renowned American-German jurist 
Francis Lieber to draft a document which contained the basic principles and accepted rules of war 
ŽŶůĂŶĚƚŽƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇforces during its armed conflict with the 
Confederate army. The Lieber Code (as it became known) was promulgated by US President 
Abraham Lincoln to Union forces in 1863 and represented the first attempt to codify and 
systematise the law of war generally and the rule relating to surrender in particular. Article 60 of 
the Lieber Code explained that it was unlawful ĨŽƌhŶŝŽŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽ ‘refuse quarter ?, which was 
interpreted to mean that Union forces were legally prohibited from making the object of attack 
members of the Confederate army that had surrendered.  
 
The Lieber Code is often regarded as providing the foundation for subsequent attempts to regulate 
warfare. The Brussels Manual 1874, although never attaining the status of treaty law, also 
precluded  ‘the refusal of quarter ? ?45 The Oxford Manual 1880, a non-binding document produced by 
ƚŚĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ŝŶũƵƌĞŽƌŬŝůůĂŶĞŶĞŵǇǁŚŽ
has surrendered at discretion or is disabled, and to declare in advance that quarter will not be given, 
                                                          
44
 /ZƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚǇ ?Ŷ ? ?ZƵůĞ ? ? ?dŚĞ/Z ?ƐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚ ŝƐŶŽƚĂƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁďƵƚ
instead intends to capture and delineate customary rules of international humanitarian law applicable to 
international and non-international armed conflict; ibid, xxiv.  
45
 Article 12(d), Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War 1874 
(referred to as the Brussels Manual). 
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even by those who do not ask iƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?46 Undoubtedly, the Brussels and Oxford Manuals 
heavily influenced the trajectory of the Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and 1907 and the 
Regulations that these conferences produced. Article 23 of both the Hague Conventions II (1899) 
and IV (1907) provides tŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĨŽƌďŝĚĚĞŶ ? 
 
c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer 
means of defence, has surrendered at discretion 
d) To declarĞƚŚĂƚŶŽƋƵĂƌƚĞƌǁŝůůďĞŐŝǀĞŶ ? 
 
Both Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions impose an obligation upon state parties 
to refrain from making the object of attack a person that has expressed an intention to surrender. 
In the context of an international armed conflict, Article 40 Additional Protocol (AP) I 1977 explains 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŝƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚƚŽŽƌĚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐŚĂůůďĞŶŽƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌƐ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? further explains that a 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ‘hors de combat ƐŚĂůůŶŽƚďĞŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬ ?ĂŶĚƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚĂ
person is hors de combat ŝĨ ‘ŚĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ? 
 
With regard to non-international armed conflict, Article 4 of Additional Protocol (AP) II 1977 
delineates ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐ ? and ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ă ?ůůƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁho do 
not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has 
been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honor and convictions and religious 
practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is 
                                                          
46
 Article 9, The Laws of War on Land 1880 (referred to as the Oxford Manual). 
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ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚƚŽŽƌĚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐŚĂůůďĞŶŽƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐ
imposing a treaty obligation upon parties to this Protocol to accept valid offers of surrender.
47
 
 
Furthermore, the Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court 1998 determines that 
in times of international
48
 and non-international armed conflict
49
 it is a war crime to make the 
object of attack persons that have surrendered. 
 
3. When is Surrender Effective under International Humanitarian Law? 
 
Now that the theoretical basis for the rule of surrender has been revealed it can be utilised 
as a lens through which state practice relating to surrender can be observed and scrutinised. 
In turn, this will allow for the conditions that trigger the obligation to accept offers of 
surrender under international humanitarian law to be more easily discerned and better 
understood.  
 
Military manuals  W which, as I have already explained, represent important sources of state 
practice that can be used to interpret treaty rules and obligations under customary 
international humanitarian law - generally fail to address how surrender can be achieved in 
practical terms during land warfare. Moreover, there are few reported instances of 
                                                          
47
 Robertson (n 3) 547. Additionally, the ICRC determines that the content of Article 4 is contained (albeit 
implicitly) in Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which can be therefore also regarded 
as imposing a legal obligation upon state parties to refrain from making the object of attack persons that have 
surrendered during a non-international armed conflict; ICRC Customary Study (n 6) 165. 
48
 Article 8(2)(b)(vi), Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court 1998 (herein referred to as the 
Rome Statute) 
49
 Article 8(2)(e)(x), ibid. 
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surrender occurring during actual hostilities that have raised difficulties under international 
humanitarian law, meaning that by and large states have not been formally required to 
determine the content and scope of the rule of surrender. Such limited state practice of 
course creates difficulties when attempting to define the contours of a rule of treaty and 
customary law. Nevertheless, available state practice in conjunction with the wider 
theoretical context within which the rule of surrender operates can be used to make 
general inferences and to draw tentative conclusions as to the meaning of this rule under 
international humanitarian law. Accordingly, I propose a three-stage test for determining 
when an act of surrender is legally effective under international humanitarian law: 
 
1. Have persons attempting to surrender engaged in a positive act which clearly indicates that 
they no longer intend to directly participate in hostilities? 
2. Is it reasonable in the circumstances for the opposing force to discern the offer of 
surrender? and 
3. Have persons surrendering unconditionally submitted to the authority of their captor? 
 
These three limbs will be now explored in greater detail. 
 
3.1 A Positive Act Indicating an Intention to No Longer Directly Participate in Hostilities  
 
If the rationale underlying the rule of surrender is that there is no military necessity to attack 
persons that have expressed the intention that they no longer intend to directly participate in 
hostilities then it follows that it is only those persons that directly participate in hostilities that 
16 
 
possess the legal capacity to surrender under international humanitarian law. If this is the case it 
becomes clear that in order to surrender it is incumbent upon such persons to perform a  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ
ĂĐƚ ?50 which indicates  ‘ŝŶĂŶĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĐůĞĂƌŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?51 that they no longer intend to directly 
participate in hostilities and therefore no longer represent a threat to the military security of the 
opposing party.  
 
Before we examine what conduct constitutes a positive act indicating an intention to no longer 
directly participate in hostilities, it is first necessary to identify which persons international 
humanitarian law regards as directly participating in hostilities during armed conflict because it is 
within this context that the rule of surrender operates.  
 
Broadly speaking, the law of international armed conflict distinguishes between two categories of 
people: combatants and civilians. Combatants are assumed to be constantly directly participating in 
hostilities and are incontrovertibly permissible objects of attack.
52
 Combatants include those persons 
who are incorporated into the regular armed forces of a state by domestic law. Combatants also 
include those members of irregular armed forces (such as militias and volunteer corps)
53
 - these 
being groups that exhibit  ‘a sufficient degree of military organization and belong[] to a party to the 
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?54 - who ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĂ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐĐŽŵďĂƚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?.55 Continuous combat function requires 
                                                          
50
 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D White, International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflict 
(Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992) 227.  
51
 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (n 1) 487. 
52
 Article 50(1) AP I; Rule 1, ICRC Customary Study (n 6 ? ? ‘[I]t is always permissible due to military necessity to 
ĂƚƚĂĐŬƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?ƐĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ ?This is so because an individual solider will always be adding to the military 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ? ?Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 86-87. 
53
 Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention 1949. Although formally the purpose of Article 4(A) is to 
delineate the criteria for determining who can be regarded as prisoners of war under the law of international 
armed conflict, it has become well accepted that this provision also provides the criteria for determining lawful 
combatancy during international armed conflict; Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict (CUP, 2016) 49 et seq. 
54
 International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009) 22.  
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lasting integration into the irregular group, which encompasses those individuals  ‘who have directly 
participated in hostilities on repeated occasions in support of an organized armed group in 
circumstances indicating that their conduct reflects a continuous combat role rather than a 
spontaneous or sporadic or temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation ?.56  
 
Combatants wishing to surrender must act purposively in order to repudiate the assumption that 
they represent a threat to military security. In the words of the US Law of War Deskbook (which is 
distributed as part of the Judge Advocate Officer Graduate and Basic Courses),  ‘the burden is upon 
the surrendering party to make his intentions clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal to the capturing 
ƵŶŝƚ ? ?57  
 
The law of international armed conflict defines civilians in negative terms as those persons that do 
not qualify as combatants.
58
 As civilians do not directly participate in hostilities they do not pose a 
threat to the military security of the opposing party. For this reason it is Ă ‘ĐĂƌĚŝŶĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?and 
 ‘ŝŶƚƌĂŶƐŐƌĞƐƐŝďůĞƌƵůĞ ?of international humanitarian law that civilians cannot be directly targeted.59 
Given their legal immunity from direct targeting, civilians do not have the legal capacity to 
surrender.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
55
 That it is only those members of an organised armed group possessing a continuous combat function to 
directly participate in hostilities that are to be regarded as combatants derives from the ICRC ?Ɛ Interpretive 
Guidance, ibid,  ? ? ?KƚŚĞƌĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ/Z ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĂůů ‘ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
military component may be treated as members of an organized armed group for targeting purposes ?
regardless of the function they perform; Michael N Schmitt and Eric W Widmar,  ‘ ‘KŶdĂƌŐĞƚ ? PWƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ĂůĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ>ĂǁŽĨdĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Journal of National Security and Policy 379, 387. 
Although not a source of law, since its publication the Interpretive Guidance has ŐĂŝŶĞĚ ‘ƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐ
ĂŶĚŝƐƚŚƵƐ ‘ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ?ŽŶthe law of targeting; Jeremy Marsh and Scott L Glebe, 
 ‘dŝŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽŝƌĞĐƚůǇWĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?  Virginia Journal of International Law Online 1, 20. 
56
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, UN Doc A/68, 389 (2013) para 69.  
57
 US Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook (International and Operational Department, 2015) 78.  
58
  ‘ ? ?ůůƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽĂƌĞŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨĂƉĂƌƚǇƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŶŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŝŶĂ
levée en masse ĂƌĞĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ?W/ ? 
18 
 
 
In those instances where civilians  ‘directly participate in hostilities ? they emerge as a threat to the 
opposing force and thus the notion of military necessity justifies their direct targeting.
60
 Conduct 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƚŽĚŝƌĞĐƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ‘ĂĐƚƐŽĨǁĂƌǁŚŝĐŚďǇƚŚĞŝƌŶĂƚƵƌĞŽƌ
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĐĂƵƐĞĂĐƚƵĂůŚĂƌŵƚŽƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůŽƌŵĂƚĞƌŝĞůŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?61 
Civilians are liable to direct ƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐ ‘ĨŽƌƐƵĐŚƚŝŵĞ ?62 that they directly participate in hostilities and 
this includes the period where the civilian is preparing to engage in conduct amounting to direct 
participation, actually engages in hostilities, and in the immediate aftermath of the hostile act being 
perpetrated.
63 
During the period of direct participation civilians are able to surrender and, as with 
combatants, in order to do so they must perform a positive act which clearly indicates that they no 
longer intend to directly participate in hostilities.  
 
The conventional view is that where civilians repeatedly directly participate in hostilities they retain 
their immunity from direct targeting even during intermissions in direct participation.
64
 Certain 
states maintain the view that where civilians repeatedly directly participate in hostilities to the 
extent that their future participation is likely and predictable they remain a threat to the military 
security of the opposing party and can be directly targeted even notwithstanding lulls in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
59
 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226, paras 78, 79.  
60
 That civilians can be directly targeted in international armed conflicts where they directly participate in 
hostilities is expressly mentioned in Article 51(3) AP I and is undoubtedly representative of customary 
international humanitarian law; The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al v. The Government of 
Israel et al, Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice, Judgment, 11 December 2006, HCJ 
769/02, para 35.  
61
 Prosecutor v Galiđ, ICTY, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, December 5, 2003, para 48. The ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance provides a fuller discussion of when a person can be regarded as directly participating in hostilities; 
ICRC Interpretive Guidance (n 54) 41-64 
62
 Article 51(3) AP I. 
63
 ICRC Interpretive Guidance (n 54) 65-68. 
64
 Ibid, 70. 
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participation.
65
 Although this is a controversial interpretation of international humanitarian law,
66
 if 
we accept arguendo that this view represents lex lata (the law as it stands) civilians that repeatedly 
directly participate in hostilities possess the capacity to surrender and, in order to become hors de 
combat and enjoy immunity from direct targeting, they must perform a positive act which signals 
that they no longer intend to participate in hostilities.  
 
With regard to the law applicable during non-international armed conflict, combatancy status does 
not exist because states are loathe to confer to insurgents the combatancy privilege that is 
available in international armed conflict, namely, immunity from prosecution under national law.
67
 
Instead, states regard insurgents as criminals and terrorists that must be held criminally responsible 
for their violent, seditious conduct. For the purpose of targeting and in order to maintain the 
principle of distinction during non-international armed conflict, the law of non-international armed 
conflict distinguishes between on the one hand  ‘armed forces ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƌŵĞĚŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ?who are often 
referred to collectively ĂƐ ‘fighters ?68) and on the other hand  ‘civilians ?.69 Fighters includes those 
persons that are formally incorporated into a ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛarmed forces via domestic law and those 
members of an organised armed group that belong to a state that is party to the armed conflict and 
who possess a continuous combat function.
70
 The notion of fighters also includes those members of 
                                                          
65
  ‘dŚĞůĂǁŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĂƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŐŝǀĞƐŶŽ “ƌĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐĚŽŽƌ ?ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞŽĨĨ-and-on 
protection in a case where a civilian repeatedly forfeits and regains his or her protection from being made the 
ŽďũĞĐƚŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŝƐƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚƉĂƌƚŝŶŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĂƚĞǆĂĐƚƚŝŵĞ ? ?
US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual (2015) para 5.9.4.2. 
66
 The ICRC for example expressly considers and then rejects this contention; ICRC Interpretive Guidance (n 54) 
70. 
67
 Louise Doswald-ĞĐŬ ? ‘dŚĞZŝŐŚƚƚŽ>ŝĨĞŝŶƌŵĞĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚ PŽĞƐ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ>ĂǁWƌŽǀŝĚĞůů
ƚŚĞŶƐǁĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Review of the Red Cross 881, 889. 
68
 Marco Sassoli and LaƵƌĂDKůƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉetween International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌŵĞĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ ?
(2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 599, 606. 
69
 Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions 1949; Article 1 AP II. 
70
 ICRC Interpretive Guidance (n 54) 31. &ŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐĐŽŵďĂƚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĞ
the text accompanying footnote 61.  
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an organised armed group that is party to a non-international armed conflict and who possess a 
continuous combat function.
71
 Fighters are assumed to be continually directly participating in 
hostilities (even during lulls in participation) and the demands of military necessity justify their 
direct targeting. Yet, the threat they represent can be repudiated and thus immunity from direct 
targeting acquired where they perform a positive act indicating they no longer intend to participate 
in hostilities, that is, they surrender. 
 
Unlike with international armed conflicts, the law of non-international armed conflict does not 
expressly define the concept of civilian notwithstanding the fact that treaty law applicable to non-
international armed conflict uses the term civilian on a number of occasions.
72
 However, the 
phraseology of these agreements means that civilians necessarily fall into a residual category of 
anyone who is not a fighter. Civilians enjoy protection from direct targeting under international 
humanitarian law but can be made the object of attack during such time that they directly 
participate in hostilities.
73
 Where they directly participate in hostilities they have the legal capacity 
to surrender and in order to do so they must engage in a positive act that clearly demonstrates 
their intention that they no longer wish to participate in hostilities.  
  
That the onus is upon those wishing to surrender to unambiguously indicate that they no longer 
intend to take a direct part in hostilities explains why international humanitarian law does not 
impose an obligation upon an opposing force to first offer their enemy the opportunity to 
                                                          
71
 Ibid 34.  
72
 For example, the concept of civilian is used in Articles 13 and 17 AP II. 
73
 Article 13(3) AP II. 
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surrender before making them the object of attack,
74
 regardless of how hopelessly outgunned and 
vanquished they may be.
75
 
 
International human rights law may muddy the waters here. International tribunals have 
determined that during times of international and non-international armed conflict international 
humanitarian law does not displace the obligations imposed upon states by international human 
rights law.
76
 Yet, the circumstances in which international human rights law is operative during 
international and non-international armed conflict is far from clear and this is particularly so in 
relation to the law of targeting.
77
 If international human rights law was to govern the manner in 
which a party to an armed conflict targets its enemy this would have a profound impact upon 
whether and to what extent force can be permissibly used. In short, while international 
humanitarian law permits parties to an armed conflict to attack (and kill) enemies even where they 
are not engaging in threatening behaviour (and assuming they are not hors de combat), 
international human rights law only permits a state to use force where necessary and 
                                                          
74
  ‘ combatant force involved in an armed conflict is not obligated to offer its opponent an opportunity to 
surrender before carrying out an attack ? ?h^ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ ?Final Report to Congress on the Conduct 
of the Persian Gulf War, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, 10 April 1992, ILM, Vol 31, 1992, 641.  
75
 This being said, under international humanitarian law persons are regarded as hors de combat and thus 
ŝŵŵƵŶĞĨƌŽŵĂƚƚĂĐŬǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĞƉĂƌƚǇ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ă ?W/ ?ZƵůĞ ? ? ?ICRC 
Customary Study (n 6). In order to be in the power of an adverse party the person in question does not have to 
be physically apprehended by the opposing force. Even in the absence of physical apprehension a person can 
be so utterly in the power of the opposing force that he or she can no longer be regarded as representing a 
military threat. In such instances the adverse party is not under an obligation to offer the opportunity to 
surrender before direct targeting can commence but, instead, international humanitarian law prohibits the 
adverse party from making such a person the object of attack. 
76
  ‘DŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƌƚĐŽŶƐŝders that the protection offered by human rights conventions does not 
ĐĞĂƐĞŝŶĐĂƐĞŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports, para 106. In the Armed Activities case the ICJ held that 
 ‘ďŽƚŚďƌĂĐŚĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶůĂǁ ?
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports, para 216. 
77
 Ɛ>ƵďĞůůĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ? ‘ ?ǁ ?ŚĞŶǁĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĐŽŵĞƚŽĂƉƉůǇŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŽƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂƌŵĞĚ
conflict, certain difficulties dŽĂƉƉĞĂƌ ? ?EŽĂŵ>ƵďĞůů ? ‘hallenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed 
ŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Interventional Review of the Red Cross 737, 738.  
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proportionate in the circumstances prevailing at the time.
78
 Although depending upon the 
circumstances, in the majority of instances it is likely that in order for force to be deemed necessary 
the state must first utilise all reasonable measures at its disposal to communicate to the enemy an 
offer of surrender and, subsequently, to ascertain whether that offer has been accepted or 
rejected.
79
  
 
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the ICJ opined that during times of armed conflict 
(presumably encompassing both international and non-international armed conflict) the legality of 
the use of lethal force must be determined according to the applicable lex specialis  W meaning that 
the law governing a specific subject matter takes precedence over law that regulates general 
matters where there is inconsistency between them
80
  W which in the context of armed conflict 
would be international humanitĂƌŝĂŶůĂǁ ?/ŶƚŚĞŽƵƌƚ ?ƐŽĨƚĞŶquoted dictum:   
 
/ŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŶŽƚĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌŝůǇƚŽďĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂƉƉůŝĞƐĂůƐŽŝŶŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined 
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 See for example McCann v United Kingdom, Application No. 18984/91, Judgment, 5 September 1995, Series 
A No 324, paras 200-205. 
79
  For example, the Human Rights Committee determined that Colombia had failed to comply with its 
international human rights law obligations when using force against members of an organised armed group 
because Colombian forces failed to offer their opponents the opportunity to surrender before targeting (and 
ŬŝůůŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞŵ ?/ŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ‘ƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇƚĂŬĞŶǁŝƚŚŽƵƚǁĂƌŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ
victims and without giving them any opportunity to surrender to the police patrol or to offer any explanation 
ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Suarez de Guerro v Colombia, Communication No. 
R.11/45, 31 March 1982, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A37/40) para 13.2.  See also Article 10 of the Basic Principles 
on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the 9
th
 UN Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August  W 7 September 1990, UN Doc 
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990) (Article 10 provides that before using force law enforcement officiaůƐ ‘ƐŚĂůů ?
give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless 
to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious 
harm to other persons ? ? ? 
80
  ‘&ŽƌƚŚĞlex specialis principle to apply it is not enough that the same subject matter is dealt with by two 
provisions; there must be some actual inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one 
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŽĞǆĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?International Law Association, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001) 140.  
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by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is 
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
81
 
 
ƵƌŝŶŐƚŝŵĞƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐƚĂƚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝƐ ‘ĨĂŝƌůǇƵŶŝĨŽƌŵ ?82 and reveals that 
targeting is to be conducted according to the more permissive standards set by international 
humanitarian law rather than the more restrictive standards imposed by international human rights 
law.
83
 
 
In the context of non-international armed conflict international tribunals have at times concurred 
with the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and concluded that the legality of the use of 
force by states must be determined according to international humanitarian law criteria.
84
 In other 
instances, however, international tribunals and human rights bodies have deviated from the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion and applied human rights law standards in determining the legality of the 
use of force by states.
85
 As Sassoli and Olson explain, case law in this area ŝƐ ‘ĐůĞĂƌůǇĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?86 
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 Nuclear Weapons (n 59) para 25. 
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 Sassoli and Olson (n 68) 603. 
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  ‘&ŽƌĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂn law is generally considered to 
constitute the lex specialis ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƚŽďĞƵƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞŶĞŵǇĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ ? ?hE
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict (2011)  ? ? ? ‘ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞŚŽƐƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶůĂǁ ?ƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞƐ
the use of force against all combatants, military objectives, members of an armed group belonging to a party 
to the [international armed] conflict, and individuals directly participating in hostilities, irrespective of their 
ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂŶǇĂĐƚŝǀĞďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚ ?; Daragh Murray, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Francoise Hampson, Charles 
Garraway, Noam Lubell and Dapo Akande, WƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?'ƵŝĚĞƚŽ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ>ĂǁŝŶƌŵĞĚConflict (OUP, 
2016) para 5.06   
84
 Abella v Argentina (Tabala), Case No 11.137, Report No 55/97, 18 November 1997. 
85
 See for example Suarez de Guerrero (n 80).  For a more detailed discussion of decisions of UN human rights 
bodies that have applied international human rights law in determining the legality of the use of force by 
states during non-international armed conflicts see Sassoli and Olson (n 68) 611-612. 
86
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and  ‘ŐŝǀĞƐŶŽĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞĂŶƐǁĞƌĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ
ƵƐŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐ ? ?87  
 
In normative terms, commentators have increasingly ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŚĞŶĞǀĞƌĂ^ƚĂƚĞŚĂƐĞŶŽƵŐŚ
control over a particular situation to enable it to detain individuals, then such an attempt must be 
made before force can be used, and non-ůĞƚŚĂůĨŽƌĐĞŵƵƐƚďĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚŝĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?.88 The view is 
that where a state and an organised armed group are actually engaging in armed hostilities, this is 
precisely the scenario where humanitarian law is designed to apply. Where however a 
ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƌƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚĂŶĂƌŵĞĚŐƌŽƵƉǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
state exercises control over the situation, the members of the armed group are under the 
jurisdiction of the state and this is a scenario that typically  ‘ƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƐƚŚĞlex 
specialis ? ?89  
 
As the law of non-international armed conflict in the context of targeting is currently  ?ƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ?,90 it 
is difficult to draw firm conclusions. If the approach described above gains traction within state 
practice (as it has done within academic literature),
91
 the consequence would be that where a 
situation is under the control of a state
92
 that is party to a non-international armed conflict 
targeting decisions must be guided by the standards set by international human rights law, 
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 Ibid, 612.  
88
 Lubell (n 77) 750. The question then becomes what degree of control over the situation is needed in order to 
ŝŶǀŽŬĞƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐůĂǁ ?dŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůǀŝĞǁŝƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ ?Ă ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐŽƵůĚ
effect arrest (of individuals or groups) without being overly concerned about interference by other rebels on 
that operation, then it has sufficient control over the place to make human rights prevail as lex specialis ? ?
Sassoli and Olson (n 69) 614. 
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 Ibid, 614. 
90
 Ibid, 606.  
91
 See for example Doswald-Beck (n 67), Lubell (n 77), Sassoli and Olson (n 68), Murray et al (n 83) para 511. 
92
 The general view is that international human rights law only imposes obligations upon states. This upshot of 
this is that non-state actors such as organised armed groups that are a party to a non-international armed 
conflict cannot be the bearer of obligations under international human rights law; WŚŝůŝƉůƐƚŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞ ‘EŽƚ-a-
Ăƚ ?^ǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ PĂŶƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐZĞŐŝŵĞĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚĞEŽŶ-^ƚĂƚĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ? ?ŝŶWŚŝůŝƉůƐƚŽŶ
(eds), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP, 2005). 
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meaning that states must make all reasonable efforts to communicate to their enemies the offer of 
surrender before they can be directly targeted.  
 
There is one instance where a party to an armed conflict is legally required to offer opposing forces 
the opportunity to surrender before direct targeting can commence. Article 42 AP I provides that in 
ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ‘ŶŽƉĞƌƐŽŶƉĂƌĂĐŚƵƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŝŶĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐƐŚĂůůďĞŵĂĚĞ
ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŽĨĂƚƚĂĐŬĚƵƌŝŶŐŚŝƐĚĞƐĐĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƵƉŽŶƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĞŶĞŵǇƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ?he or she must be 
ŐŝǀĞŶĂ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌďefore being made the object of attack, unless it is 
ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŚĞŝƐĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐŝŶĂŚŽƐƚŝůĞĂĐƚ ? ? Although Article 42 AP I pertains to international 
armed conflicts, the rule it contains is also applicable to non-international armed conflicts on the 
basis of Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions 1949, which protects persons placed 
hors de combat ďǇ ‘ĂŶǇ ?ĐĂƵƐĞ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ZƵůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ/Z ?ƐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚŝŶ
times of international and non-international armed conflict customary international law prohibits 
making the object of attack persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress.
93
  
 
The rationale underlying this rule can be explained on the basis that where it is discernible that 
persons have parachuted from an aircraft in distress and are not engaging in hostile acts, this is 
regarded as a form of positive conduct that signals that they no longer represent a threat to 
military security and thus there is no military necessity to directly target them. However, where 
persons parachute from an aircraft and are not in distress or are in distress but nevertheless engage 
in a hostile act, a threat to military security is present and they can be made the object of attack. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that Article 42 AP I expressly ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŝƌďŽƌŶĞƚƌŽŽƉƐĂre not 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ?ďǇƚŚŝƐƌƵůĞ Wairborne troops are militarily active and have yet to engage in a positive act 
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that indicates an intention to place themselves hors de combat. Put differently, there is a pressing 
military need to directly target them. 
 
Moving forward, the next question that needs to be addressed is what positive act persons must 
exhibit in order to reveal an intention that they no longer intend to directly participate in hostilities. 
Article 23(c) of Hague Convention IV ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚ ‘[t]o kill or wound an enemy who, 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐůĂŝĚĚŽǁŶŚŝƐĂƌŵƐ ?ŽƌŚĂǀŝŶŐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĂƐƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĂƚĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?
The wording of this provision is repeated verbatim by Article 8(2)(b)(vi) of the Rome Statute, which 
stipulates that in times of an international armed conflict it is a war crime to kill or wound persons 
ǁŚŽ ? ‘ŚĂǀŝŶŐůĂŝĚĚŽǁŶŚŝƐĂƌŵƐŽƌŚĂǀŝŶŐŶŽŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĂƐƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĂƚĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ?At 
least for the purpose of these international legal rules, the laying down of weapons is an effective 
method through which to express an intention to surrender.   
 
While other international humanitarian law treaties impose an obligation upon opposing forces to 
accept valid offers of surrender, they do not provide any guidance as to what conduct (verbal or 
otherwise) signifies an intention to surrender. For example, Article 41(2) AP I expressly imposes an 
obligation to accept offers of surrender but merely states that a person is hors de combat where he 
or she  ‘expresses an intention to surrender ?. Similarly, although containing the rule of surrender, 
Common Article 3 and Article 4 AP II do not specify the conditions that constitute an effective 
surrender. The ICRC insists that customary international law also imposes an obligation to refrain 
from targeting those that have surrendered yet Rule 47 of the ICRC ?Ɛ Customary Study provides no 
further guidance on what conduct constitutes a legally effective surrender, merely stating that a 
person is immune from attack where he or she  ‘ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ? 
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Guidance on how a person expresses an intention to surrender is provided by the Official 
Commentary to Article 41(2) API: 
 
In lĂŶĚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ? a soldier who wishes to indicate that he is no longer capable of 
engaging in combat, or that he intends to cease combat, lays down his arms and 
raises his hands. Another way is to ceasefire, wave a white flag and emerge from a 
ƐŚĞůƚĞƌǁŝƚŚŚĂŶĚƐƌĂŝƐĞĚ ?If he is surprised, a combatant can raise his arms to 
indicate that he is surrendering, even though he may still be carrying weapons.
94
        
 
This chimes with the /Z ?ƐCommentary to Rule 47 which, aĨƚĞƌĐŝƚŝŶŐ ‘many military 
ŵĂŶƵĂůƐ ?, ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ŝ ?n land warfare, a clear intention to surrender is generally shown 
ďǇůĂǇŝŶŐĚŽǁŶŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚƌĂŝƐŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐŚĂŶĚƐ ?ŽƌďǇ  ‘ĚŝƐƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐ ? ?95  
 
Given that the relevant treaties are silent as to what conduct constitutes an act of 
surrender, state practice becomes an important indicator as to how ambiguous or unclear 
treaty provisions must be interpreted.
96
 State practice (coupled with opinio juris) is also key 
to interpreting obligations imposed by customary international law.
97
 In essence, then, 
whether the discarding of weapons (where a person is in possession of weapons) and 
placing hands above the head or waiving the white flag constitute an effective method of 
expressing an intention to surrender boils down to whether such conduct is supported by 
state practice. 
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 Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (n 1) 486-487.  
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 ICRC Customary Study (n 6) 168. A number of academics also hold this view. See for example Sandesh 
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 Article 31(3)(b), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.  
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Importantly, a significant number of military manuals produced by states identify the laying 
down of weapons and the raising of hands as an acceptable means through which to 
manifest an intention to surrender,
98
 indicating that such conduct achieves sufficient 
support among states to amount to a legally recognisable act of surrender under relevant 
treaty and customary international humanitarian law. The picture is more complex however 
in relation to the white flag.  
 
In lay terms many are likely to regard the waiving of the white flag as a widely recognised method of 
indicating a desire to surrender. Indeed, there is support for this approach in a number of military 
manuals. For example, ĂŵĞƌŽŽŶ ?Ɛ/ŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ Manual ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐŝƐƚŚĞƐǇŵďŽůŽĨ
ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŽĨƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐĞƐƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌǇƚŽƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞĐĞĂƐĞĨŝƌĞƌƵůĞƐ ? ?99 
ĞůŐŝƵŵ ?ƐdĞĂĐŚŝŶŐDĂŶƵĂůĨŽƌ^ŽůĚŝĞƌƐĂůƐŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽ
surrender may be expressed in different ways: laid down arms, raised hands ?ǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐ ? ?100 &ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
DĂŶƵĂůŽŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽĨƌŵĞĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ă ?ŶŝŶƚĞŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŵƵƐƚďĞĐůĞĂƌůǇ
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ďǇƌĂŝƐŝŶŐŚĂŶĚƐ ?ƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŐĚŽǁŶǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŽƌǁĂŝǀŝŶŐĂǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐ ? ?101 Similarly, the 
ŽŵŝŶŝĐĂŶZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐDŝůŝƚĂƌǇDĂŶƵĂůĂĐĐĞƉƚƐthat once a white flag is waved this signals an intent to 
surrender and the opposing force must cease firing ĨƌŽŵƚŚĂƚŵŽŵĞŶƚ P ‘dŚĞĞŶĞŵǇƐŽůĚŝĞƌŵĂǇ
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reach a point where he would rather surrender than fight. He may signal to you with a white flag, by 
emerging from his position with arms raiƐĞĚŽƌǇĞůůŝŶŐƚŽĐĞĂƐĞĨŝƌĞ ? ?102  
 
However, not all states identify the white flag as being indicative of an intention to surrender. In fact, 
a number of states expressly reject the contention that the waving of a white flag is constitutive of 
surrender. The US, for example, claims that  ‘ ?ǁ ?ĂŝǀŝŶŐĂǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇŝƐnot a sign of 
ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ?ďƵƚƐŝŐŶĂůƐĂĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞ ?103 ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞŚoisting of a white flag has no 
ŽƚŚĞƌůĞŐĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?104 The US Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook also rejects the 
use of the white flag as being declarative of surrender. The Deskbook discusses the use of the white 
flag in the context of the 1982 Falklands Conflict: 
   
During the Battle for Goose Green, some Argentinean soldiers raised a white flag. 
A British lieutenant and two soldiers advanced to accept what they thought was a 
proffered surrender. They were killed by enemy fire in a disputed incident. 
Apparently, one group of Argentines was attempting to surrender, but not the 
other group. The Argentine conduct was arguably treachery if those raising the 
white flag killed the British soldiers, but not if other Argentines fired unaware of 
the white flag. This incident emphasizes the rule that the white flag indicates 
merely a desire to negotiate, and its hoister has the burden to come forward.
105
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Other states similarly reject the contention that the white flag indicates an intention to surrender. 
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĂŶĂĚĂ ?ƐŽĚĞŽĨŽŶĚƵĐƚƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?he showing of a white flag is not necessarily 
ĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƚƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?106 The Teaching Manual for the armed forces of Côte 
Ě ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ĂůƐŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐŝƐƵƐĞĚƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŽ
protect the persons who negotiate. It does not necessarily indicate  W as it is often believed  W an 
ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?107 
 
The h< ?ƐDĂŶƵĂůŽŶƚŚĞ>Ăw of Armed Conflict is interesting because it equivocates as to whether 
the white flag expresses an intention to surrender, epitomising the lack of clarity as to the status of 
the white flag under international humanitarian law. Initially, the Manual explains that: 
 
From time immemorial, a white flag has been used as a signal of a desire to open 
communications with the enemy. This is the only meaning that the white flag 
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁŽĨĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?dŚĞĚŝƐƉůĂǇŽĨĂǁŚŝƚĞĨůĂŐŵĞĂŶƐŽŶůǇ
that one party is asked whether it will receive a communication from the other.
108
  
 
TŚĞDĂŶƵĂůƚŚĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?Ğ ?verything depends on the circumstances and 
conditions of the particular case. For instance, in practice, the white flag has come to 
indicate surrender if displayed by individual soldiers or a small party in the course of an 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?109  
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In light of this disagreement, Henderson is surely correct in his assertion that the  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞĨůǇŝŶg of a 
white flag is not ĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞƐǇŵďŽůŽĨƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?110  
 
One final question remains: does the act of retreat amount to conduct signalling an intention to 
surrender under either treaty or customary international law? Neither treaty law, including the 
relevant commentaries, nor military manuals indicate that retreat is indicative of surrender. But 
this issue is nevertheless relevant because during the First Gulf War American forces overran Iraqi 
troops near the Kuwait-Iraq border and American forces continued to directly target Iraqi forces 
even though they were in clear retreat. The US military was criticised for this conduct.
111
 In 
responding to these criticisms the US Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress which 
maintained that the act of retreat does not amount to a positive act that clearly reveals an 
intention to surrender: 
 
It is recognized by military professionals that a retreating force remains dangerous. 
The 1st Marine Division and its 4, 000 attached U.S. Army forces and British Royal 
Marines, in the famous 1950 march out of the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea, 
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fighting outnumberĞĚďǇĂ ? P ?ŵĂƌŐŝŶ ?ƚƵƌŶĞĚŝƚƐ “ƌĞƚƌĞĂƚ ? into a battle in which it 
defeated the 20
th
 and 26
th
 Chinese Armies trying to annihilate it.
112
 
 
The US Law of War DĂŶƵĂůƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ P ‘ŶĞŵǇĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐƌĞŵĂŝŶůŝĂďůĞƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬǁŚĞŶ
retreating. Retreat is not the same as surrender. Retreating forces remain dangerous as the enemy 
force may recover to counterattack, consolidate a new defensive position, or assist the war effort in 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇƐ ? ?113 This view is also endorsed by the ICRC, which explains that  ‘[t]he law of armed 
conflict does not prohibit attacks on retreating enemy forces. At the level of small units, for 
example, once an objective has been seized, an attacking force is trained to fire on the retreating 
enemy to discourĂŐĞŽƌƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĂƚƚĂĐŬ ? ?114 As a result, state practice makes it  ‘clear that 
thĞƐŝŵƉůĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚƌŽŽƉƐĂƌĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƚƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?115  
 
3.2 Is it Reasonable in the Circumstances for the Opposing Force to Discern the Offer of Surrender?  
 
Surrender is a legal exchange constituted by a valid offer and its subsequent acceptance.
116
 Where 
a person engages in a positive act that reveals to the opponent that he or she no longer intends to 
directly participate in hostilities, the opposing force is legally obligated to accept that offer of 
surrender and refrain from making such a person the object of attack.
117
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An interesting incident came to light in October 2010 as a result of classified US military logs being 
published by the whistle blower website Wikileaks.
118
 The logs revealed that during the Second Gulf 
War a US Apache helicopter engaged a truck containing two Iraqi insurgents. The US pilots then 
radioed military headquarters explaining that the two insurgents had  ‘ĐĂŵĞŽƵƚ[of the truck] 
wanting ƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?119 Military headquarters subsequently communicated to the pilots the legal 
advice ŽĨĂh^ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇůĂǁǇĞƌ P ‘>ĂǁǇĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŶŽƚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌƚŽĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŶĚĂƌĞƐƚŝůůǀĂůŝĚ
ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ?120 The Apache helicopter opened fire on the insurgents, eventually killing them both. 
Commenting upon the incident, ZŽďĞƌƚƐĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞ ‘ ?s]urrender is not always a 
ƐŝŵƉůĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůĂĚǀŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞh^ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇůĂǁǇĞƌƚŚĂƚŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĐĂŶŶŽƚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌƚŽ
aircraft and thus offers of surrender in such circumstances can be permissibly refused was 
 ‘ĚŽŐŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚǁƌŽŶŐ ? ?121 Roberts further adĚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĂƚŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƐŝŵƉůǇ
cannot surrender to aircraft. The issue is that ground forces in such circumstances need to 
ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶǁĂǇƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂů ? ?122 Where a valid offer of surrender is 
communicated to an opponent, there is a legal obligation upon the opponent to accept that offer 
and to refrain from making surrendered persons the object of attack. 
 
In light of the fog of war that inevitably (and often densely) hangs over armed conflict, it may be 
the case that an enemy expresses an intention to surrender but the circumstances existing at the 
time prevent the opposing force from discerning the offer of surrender. During the First Gulf War 
US tanks equipped with earthmoving plough blades breached Iraqi defences and then turned and 
filled in trenches, entombing Iraqi soldiers that had sought to surrender. A US Report into the 
incident explained:  
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[The opponent] may not refuse an offer of surrender when communicated, but 
that communication must be made at a time when it can be received and properly 
acted upon  W an attempt to surrender in the midst of a hard-fought battle is 
neither easily communicated nor received. The issue is one of reasonableness.
123
 
 
The Report continues: 
 
[A] soldier who fights to the very last possible moment assumes certain risks. His 
opponent either may not see his surrender, may not recognize his actions as an attempt 
to surrender in the heat and confusion of battle, or may find it difficult (if not impossible) 
ƚŽŚĂůƚĂŶŽŶƌƵƐŚŝŶŐĂƐƐĂƵůƚƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĂƐŽůĚŝĞƌ ?ƐůĂƐƚŵŝŶƵƚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌ ?124     
 
Thus, the test imposed by international humanitarian law is whether a reasonable combatant 
operating in those circumstances would have been expected to discern the offer of surrender. This 
approach is consistent with the obligation arising under the law of international
125
 and non-
international
126
 armed conflict that when launching an attack combatants and fighters must take all 
feasible precautions to avoid or minimise damage to non-military objects such as civilians and those 
hors de combat.
127
 What are feasible precautions is difficult to define but Article 3(4) of the 
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Convention on Conventional Weapons 1980 describes thĞŵĂƐ ‘ƚŚŽƐĞƉƌĞĐĂƵƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞ
practicable and practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?
 
To illustrate, it may not be reasonable or feasible to expect a combatant or fighter that engages his 
or her enemies at speed and at night-time to identify an offer of surrender and as a result refrain 
from making them the object of attack. The conclusion may be different in a scenario where a 
commander has his or her enemy pinned down and the enemy decides to surrender but, for 
various reasons (distance between the respective parties, inimical terrain, inclement weather etc), 
the offer of surrender is not immediately apparent to the opposing commander. International 
humanitarian law nevertheless requires the commander to take all reasonable and feasible 
measures to ensure that the targets remain permissible objects of attack before launching an 
offensive. For example, it may be reasonable for the commander to utilise readily available 
equipment such as night vision goggles or high performance binoculars to check whether the 
enemy has expressed an intention to surrender before they are engaged, providing of the course 
the time spent preparing the equipment or using it does not compromise military objectives.  
 
All in all, the point is that even if an offer of surrender is validly extended under international 
humanitarian law, if that offer cannot be reasonably discerned in the circumstances then - from the 
perspective of the opposing force - the threat represented by the enemy remains and the principle 
of military necessity continues to justify their direct targeting. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
obligation to avoid or minimise harm to non-military objects generally (including those hors de combat). This is 
the requirement of Article 57(2)(a)(i) AP I, which explains ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƉůĂŶŽƌĚĞĐŝĚĞƵƉŽŶĂŶĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŚĂůů
do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and 
not subject to special protections but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 
and that it is not ƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚŝƐWƌŽƚŽĐŽůƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬƚŚĞŵ ? ?
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3.3 Have the Persons Surrendering Unconditionally Submitted to the Authority of their Opponent? 
 
ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ?W/ĂŶĚZƵůĞ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞ/Z ?ƐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇ^ƚƵĚ stipulate that a person that surrenders 
ďƵƚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞƐŝŶĂ ‘ŚŽƐƚŝůĞĂĐƚ ?Žƌ ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ?Ɛ ?ŽĞƐĐĂƉĞ ?is no longer regarded as hors 
de combat and again becomes liable to direct targeting.
128
 While the notion of attempting escape is 
relatively self-explanatory, what constitutes a hostile act is far from clear. AP I does not define what 
amounts to a hostile act but the Commentary to the Additional Protocol provides examples, such as 
resuming combat functions if the opportunity arises, attempting to communicate with their own 
party, and destroying installations and equipment belonging to their captor or to their own party.
129
  
 
State practice points towards a broad reading of the notion of what is a hostile act. State practice 
indicates that a surrendered person that fails to comply unconditionally with the instructions of the 
opposing force commits a hostile act and thereby forfeits immunity from targeting;
130
 in other words, 
surrendered persons must ƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ‘at the captor ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?.131 The act of surrender is 
therefore a continuing obligation insofar as the persons surrendering must continually comply with 
the demands of their captor. Thus, persons that refuse to heed to demands to kneel or lay on the 
ground, place their hands behind their back, remain silent, stand still etc do not submit to the 
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authority of their opponent and do not surrender for the purpose of international humanitarian law. 
Presumably, surrendered persons only have to comply with reasonable demands of their captor  W 
captors cannot require their captives to undertake conduct that exposes them to danger and, if they 
refuse to comply, determine that they have committed a hostile act and are therefore liable to 
attack. Certainly, a captor cannot demand captives to act incompatibly with international 
humanitarian law (for example, ordering them shoot civilians or instructing them to act in a way that 
is in contravention of their legal rights as prisoners of war) and, if these demands are not complied 
with, determine that they have engaged in a hostile act and can be thus made the object of attack. 
 
As an illustration, during the Falklands Conflict the Director of the UK Army Legal Services stated 
that where enemy combatants had surrendered but UK armed forces continued to come under fire 
from other enemy combatants, UK forces were entitled to remain in their positions and demand 
that surrendered persons advance forward. Failure to adhere to such demands  W providing they 
were reasonable in the sense that they did not place the surrendering forces in danger of being 
caught in cross-fire  W would constitute an unwillingness to submit themselves to the authority of 
their captor and which would therefore vitiate their surrender, meaning that they would remain 
permissible objects of attack under international humanitarian law.
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In sum, persons that demonstrate an intent to surrender create a rebuttable presumption that they 
are hors de combat and no longer a threat to the enemy. Persons that attempt to escape or commit 
a hostile act  W meaning that they fail to submit to the authority of their opponent  W indicate that 
they are resuming participation in hostilities.  As a result, they re-emerge as a threat to military 
security and the opposing force is justified in making them the object of attack.  
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4. Conclusion  
 
The obligation to accept offers of surrender and to refrain from directly targeting surrendered 
persons is justified on the basis that there is no military necessity to directly target those that no 
longer intend to directly participate in hostilities and that such conduct represents an unacceptable 
affront to human dignity. This article has explored state practice with the view to clarifying the 
criteria that give rise to an effective act of surrender under conventional and customary 
international humanitarian law in times of international and non-international armed conflict.  
 
The contribution of this article has been to propose a tripartite test for determining what conduct 
constitutes an act of surrender and therefore triggers a legal obligation upon the opposing force to 
ceasefire:  1) have surrendering persons taken positive steps to clearly indicate that they are outside 
of the theatre of war and thus no longer represent a threat to the opposing force? 2) is it reasonable 
in the circumstances for the opposing force to discern the offer of surrender? and 3) have the 
persons surrendering unconditionally submitted themselves to the authority of their captor? 
 
Perhaps the thorniest issue is what positive act (or acts) are recognised by international 
humanitarian law as expressing an intention to surrender. From a survey of military manuals I have 
revealed that the laying down of weapons and the raising of hands is a widely accepted method of 
indicating an intention to surrender under both conventional and customary international 
humanitarian law. Contrary to popular belief, the waiving of a white flag is not a legally recognised 
method of expressing an intention to surrender under either conventional or customary 
international humanitarian law  W it does not attract sufficient support within state practice and 
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indeed the practice of a number of states openly rejects the contention that the waiving of a white 
flag is constitutive of surrender.  
 
It is therefore concerning that a number of military manuals erroneously identify the white flag as a 
sign of surrender under international humanitarian law. In doing so, these manuals wrongly instruct 
their armed forces to recognise that those waiving the white flag cannot be attacked and that, by 
implication, if they themselves wish to surrender the waiving of a white flag is an effective method 
of manifesting this intention to the enemy. Given the importance of surrender to realising the 
humanitarian objective that underpins international humanitarian law, international humanitarian 
law must embrace a common vernacular that enables those embroiled in armed conflict to engage 
in conduct with the confidence that it is a recognised method of expressing an intention to 
surrender. The status and function of the white flag is clearly an area that requires urgent 
clarification by states and the international community as a whole and this article has sought to 
catalyse this process and also contribute to it.
133
  
                                                          
133
 Incidentally, international humanitarian law (including the law of international and non-international armed 
conflict  W see Article 37(1) AP I and Rule 65, ICRC Customary Study (n 6)) and international criminal law (during 
both international and non-international armed conflict - see respectively Article 8(2)(b)(xi) and Article 
8(2)(e)(ix) Rome Statute) it is unlawful to invite the confidence of adversaries with the purpose of injuring or 
capturing them. Such conduct is known as perfidy. It is well established that feigning surrender in order to 
invite the confidence of an enemy is a perfidious act. Resolving the question of what conduct expresses an 
intention to surrender would therefore produce a collateral benefit of also clarifying the rule relating to 
perfidy. 
